Sunday, January 12, 2020

I know it has been a very long time since my last update. This case is drawing to a close and there will be a very positive outcome probably within 6 weeks. This outcome will likely make front-page headlines. For those who know the details of what I had distributed in my flyer, nothing has changed.

Monday, March 25, 2019


Nothing new to report.  Still waiting for big things to happen and to share.
Ivan Greenberg, March 25, 2019

SOON. Aug. 4, 2019

Saturday, December 22, 2018

Update: Status of My Legal Struggles

Nothing new to report.  The prior note still describes the state of things,  Fingers crossed there will be news to report soon.

Ivan Greenberg

Thursday, September 6, 2018

Status of my legal struggles

September 6, 2018

For people who are familiar with my long-standing legal struggles against the FBI for civil rights violations, I wanted to provide an update about the current state of affairs.

During the last year, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been working behind the scenes negotiating a settlement on my behalf and also getting the FBI to alter some loathsome counterintelligence practices.

My understanding is that several times FBI/DOJ has been close to signing papers to end this case, but then backed away from doing so.  Congressional oversight committees are aware of this case. FBI has made terroristic threats of violence against people involved in this case.

Right now, there are conflicting signals about where this case stands.  I will provide updates when information becomes available. 

Friday, January 6, 2017

Bibliography of my scholarship on the FBI, surveillance, and civil liberties


Suspicious Activity is Everywhere: Essays on Post-9/11 America (in progress, 480 pages).

Surveillance in America: Critical Analysis of the FBI, 1920 to the Present (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).

The Dangers of Dissent: The FBI and Civil Liberties since 1965 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).


"Is Mass Surveillance A Useful Tool in the Fight Against Terrorism," in Richard Jackson and Daniela Pisoiu, eds., Contemporary Debates on Terrorism  (Routledge, 2018), 233-240. 

“The State Response to Occupy: Surveillance and Suppression,” in Todd A. Comer, ed., What Comes After Occupy?: The Regional Politics of Resistance (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015),  234-259.

“From Surveillance to Torture: The Evolution of U.S. Interrogation Practices during the War on Terror,” Security Journal (April 2015): 165-183.

“Everyone is a Terrorist Now: Marginalizing Protest in the U.S.,” Radical Criminology  2 (Fall 2013): 125-138.

“The FBI’s Attack on Dissent,” in Jeffrey Shantz, ed., Protest and Punishment: The Repression of Resistance in the Era of Neoliberal Globalization (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012), 49-76.

“The FBI and the Making of the Terrorist Threat,” Radical History Review 111 (Fall 2011): 35-50.

“Reagan Revives FBI Spying,” in Kimberly R. Moffitt and Duncan Campbell, eds., The 1980s: A Critical and Transitional Decade (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 43-64. 

“Government Suppression of Social Activism,” in Gary L. Anderson and Kathryn Kerr, eds., Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 632-636.

“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” in David L. Hudson, David A. Schultz, and John R. Vile, eds., Encyclopedia of the First Amendment  (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2008).

“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” in Nikki Brown and Barry Stentiford, eds., Jim Crow Encyclopedia (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 2008), 294-298.  [new edition in 2016]


“American Hustle: True or False?” History News Network, Feb. 10, 2014, [reprinted at Hollywood Progressive website]

“On the Internment of American Radicals,” Oct. 5, 2012, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group,

“Surveillance and the Communications of Americans,” June 14, 2012, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group,

“Surveillance Directed at Critics of the FBI,” May 18, 2011, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group,

“Deep Throat and Government Records,” History News Network, Dec. 6, 2010,

“Civil Rights Photojournalist Named as FBI Spy,” Sept. 20, 2010, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group,

Friday, September 9, 2016

The First Domestic Mass Data Mining Systems

Mass data mining first was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the late 1990s and supervised by its Data Intercept Technology Unit. The first program, whose name remains a secret, debuted in 1996 and was replaced by the programs known as Omnivore in 1997 and Carnivore in 1999. (Carnivore later was renamed DCS-1000.) Carnivore was “packet sniffer” software: It captures the e-mail messages of a specific target from the e-mail traffic that travelled through the network of an Internet service provider (ISP). In 2000, when the program was publicly disclosed, the FBI said it “chews all the data on the network, but it only actually eats the information authorized by the court order.”[i] In another statement of this view, an assistant FBI Director told Congress in 2000: “[Carnivore] does NOT search through the contents of every message and collect those that contain certain key words like ‘bomb’ or ‘drugs.’ It selects messages based on criteria expressly set out in the court order, for example, messages transmitted to or from a particular account or to or from a particular us.”[ii] So before 9/11, the FBI said the program did not conduct mass data mining, although it had that capability.

Carnivore became a mass surveillance tool, bypassing the warrant requirement to search records, sometime after the attacks of September 11, 2001. I have tried to identify when exactly this changeover to mass surveillance for phone and internet records occurred, but it is difficult to pinpoint based on the current state of public knowledge. To be sure, FBI mass data-mining efforts are authorized under the USA Patriot Act (2001) and FBI Guidelines (2002) for investigation issued by the U.S. Justice Department. Carnivore (or DSC- 1000) was used until 2005 and replaced by a program known as NarusInsight. The technology writer Declan McCullagh writes that NarusInsight “can record all Internet traffic, including Web browsing--or, optionally, only certain subsets such as all e-mail messages flowing through the network. Interception typically takes place inside an Internet provider's network at the junction point of a router or network switch.” According to Kevin Bankston, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, "What they're doing is intercepting everyone and then choosing their targets." This approach is called “full-pipe” surveillance and critics have questioned its legality. [iii]

[i] E. Judson Jennings, “Carnivore: US Government Surveillance of Internet Transmissions,” Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 6: 10 (Summer 2001). See also Talitha Nabbali and Mark Perry, “Going for the Throat: Carnivore in an Echelon Word- Part I,” Computer Law and Security Report Vol. 19 no. 6 (2003): 460.

[ii] Oversight Hearings on “Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ Program,” Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), July 24, 2000 (quoted in Jennings, “Carnivore”).

[iii] Dean McCullagh, “FBI turns to Broad New Wiretap Method,” ZDNeT, January 30, 2007; Richard Koman, “FBI ‘Full-Pipe’ Surveillance May be Illegal,” ZDNet, January 31, 2007.

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

What Does Your "Metadata" Say?

In 2005, Washington Post journalist Robert O’Harrow published a popular book on mass data-mining entitled, No Place to Hide.  He identified new ways both industry and government collect vast amounts of personal information on Americans by working separately and also in collaboration.  The “War on Terror” had accentuated a data-driven surveillance society. The book received widespread notice. The conservative columnist William Safire wrote in the New York Times: “The computer's ability to collect an infinity of data about individuals -- tracking every movement and purchase, assembling facts and traits in a personal dossier, forgetting nothing -- was in place before 9/11. But among the unremarked casualties of that day was a value that Americans once treasured: personal privacy.” The idea that individuals could retain a sphere that is ''nobody's business'' rapidly had disintegrated.  A new “big business of everybody's business” had become the order of the day.
            Meanwhile, liberal law professor Geoffrey R. Stone, after reading O’Harrow, raised an existential question. “Once we understand that our every move is being tracked, monitored, recorded and collated, will we retain our essential sense of individual autonomy and personal dignity?” Where do people retreat if there is no place to hide?  There also are serious risks inherent in the construction of new data-based dossiers: data error; stolen data; and unintended public data disclosure.  Finally, as Stone notes, government may use its data collection capability “to suppress dissent and impose conformity.”  Despite official claims that data-mining promotes security, “history teaches that once government has such information, it will inevitably use it to harass and silence those who question its policies.”
            To be sure, O’Harrow was not the first writer to tackle this important subject matter.  Almost a decade earlier, academic specialists David Lyon and Elia Zureik edited an important book, Computers, Surveillance, and Privacy (1996), in which they had identified the new issue of “dataveillance.” For example, one of the authors in that volume, Colin J. Bennett, wrote:
 Mass dataveillance begins with no a priori knowledge of the individual(s) who may warrant attention. Its aim is to screen groups of people with a view to finding those worth subjecting to personal dataveillance. It is based on a general rather than specific suspicion, but also tries to deter or constrain behavior. All forms of computer matching are mass dataveillance techniques. They all involve the aggregate comparison of different data systems to identify those ‘hits’ that prima facie warrant further investigation.
Today, mass data-mining affects more Americans than ever before.  This is so because electronic records widely have displaced paper records and electronic communications now are prevalent in many spheres of both our personal and public lives.  More than 90 percent of Americans use cell phones.  The Internet has spread across the landscape transcending boundaries of race, gender, and class. In 2013, more than 85 percent of the nation’s population regularly went online.  More than half of the entire American adult population uses online social networking sites.  U.S. authorities also ask online service companies for account information on thousands of individuals.  To some extent, the idea that too much data now exists to make sense of it is relevant.  The common concern -- “drowning in data but starving for knowledge” —poses challenges for government data-mining, but the official development of more efficient systems for record matching and sorting promises to keep pace with the explosion of information.
            Of course, not all data-mining is nefarious. It can be an effective tool for scientists and other researchers, who refer to it as “knowledge extraction” and “information harvesting.”  It builds knowledge from large sets of data by identifying patterns; it makes generalizations about future behavior based on past behavior.  Data-mining can be used for “pattern detection” to identify small departures from the norm, or unusual patterns.  As information analyst Joyce Jackson notes, “Data mining allows the automated discovery of implicit patterns and interesting knowledge that’s hiding in large amounts of data.”
            But while data-mining proves useful in some fields, its application to the “War on Terror” at best is dubious. There is no way that patterns discerned from data analysis can predict political violence.  What may appear to be “suspicious” behaviors or patterns likely are anomalies – an oddity or peculiarity with little discernible meaning.  Using anomalies to create a suspect list is deeply flawed.  As Jim Harper of the Cato Institute concludes:
First, terrorist acts and their precursors are too rare in our society for there to be patterns to find. There simply is no nugget of information to mine.
Second, the lack of suitable patterns means that any algorithm used to turn up supposedly suspicious behavior or suspicious people will yield so many false positives as to make it useless. A list of potential terror suspects generated from pattern analysis would not be sufficiently targeted to justify investigating people on the list.
A major study conducted by the National Research Council confirms this analysis.  The report, ironically funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, offers a blistering attack on the effectiveness of data-mining for terrorism discovery. “Automated identification of terrorists through data mining (or any other known methodology) is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts," the report found. "Even in well-managed programs, such tools are likely to return significant rates of false positives, especially if the tools are highly automated." A false positive -- that is, erroneously identifying someone as a terrorist suspect -- can have disastrous consequences for individuals.  It can lead to major privacy intrusions, as well as targeted surveillance and harassment in everyday life if security agencies decide to “neutralize” subjects. False positives can lead to individuals “being in trouble with the government” for no legitimate reason.      
            So the ability of government to sort through mass data to discover preparation and planning for terrorism is a waste of resources. By contrast, data-mining is very effective to identify people and groups involved in dissident politics.  Both the FBI and NSA can sort through billions of records to find patterns of expression critical of government. Once the FBI locates subjects to neutralize, they can use data-mining directed at specific individuals to maximize their intelligence operations.  The National Research Council reports: 

"Once an individual is under strong suspicion of participating in some kind of terrorist activity, it is standard practice to examine that individual’s financial dealings, social networks, and comings and goings to identify coconspirators, for direct surveillance, etc. Data mining can expedite much of this by providing such information as (1) the names of individuals who have been in e‑mail and telephone contact with the person of interest in some recent time period, (2) alternate residences, (3) an individual’s financial withdrawals and deposits, (4) people that have had financial dealings with that individual, and (5) recent places of travel."

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Some Current Writing Projects

I am working on several writing projects:
  • A graphic novel on the history of surveillance to be published in 2017.
  • Forms of monitoring in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four.
  • Political policing in an Oligarchy.
  • Some thoughts on "authorization."
  • Government surveillance of ethnic groups in the U.S.

Friday, November 27, 2015

A new book, Facing the Future: Paintings, 2007-2010

I wear several different hats.  Besides being an engaged writer on surveillance, social movements and civil liberties, I am a visual artist (painter).  A new book featuring my art has been published by Cyberwit.  It features work completed from 2007 through 2010.

Thursday, November 12, 2015

Two Book Chapters are Forthcoming

"A White Man in the Colored Bronx" in Teresa A. Booker, ed., Public Space, Public Policy and Public Understanding of Race and Ethnicity in America: An Interdisciplinary Approach, (University of Akron Press, 2016).

"Is Mass Surveillance an Effective Tool in Fighting Terrorism?" in Richard Jackson and Daniela Pisoiu, eds., Contemporary Debates on Terrorism Vol. 2, (Routledge, 2016).